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Abstract
Credit Risk in Peer to Peer Lending is an emerging field with practical implications for U.S
banking system. Peer to Peer Lending is a type of online lending process which uses
nontraditional bank channels. The inexorable rise of Fintechs has led to an extraordinary change
in financial intermediation. This paper examines the factors that are critical in predicting default
in Peer to Peer lending. The paper finds that FICO score, debt-to-income ratio , the loan amount,
the credit grade assigned by the online lending platform are all critical factors of the credit risk
evaluation process. Furthermore, models with hyperparameters such as neural networks and
random forest do not reliably outperform classical logistic regression in the prediction of credit
default. Finally, this paper makes vital policy recommendations to strengthen the efficiency of
marketplace lending and provides a set of rules to prevent another crisis of the magnitude of the
great recession.
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer Lending, Credit Risk, FICO, P2P Loan Default, Consumer Credit, Logistic
Regression.
JEL Codes: C45, C51, E44, G21, G28, G50.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This paper estimates credit risk default in the peer to peer lending market space in the
U.S. The Peer to Peer (P2P) lending is the process of lending online to individuals and
businesses outside of the traditional banking networks. P2P Lending or marketplace lending
seems inexorably poised to grab a sizable portion of the market share in credit lending, as much
as $90 billion in originations by 2020 (Treasury, 2016). The largest players in the U.S market
include platforms such as Lending Club, Prosper, Peerform, Upstarts and Funding Circle. These
platforms intend to displace traditional banking through financial disintermediation and
technology. Essentially matching investors directly to borrowers and doing so more efficiently
than banks. Given their lower legacy costs and efficiency gains from technological innovations,
these platforms can offer borrowers lower interest rates than traditional bank (Milne &
Parboteeah, 2016). Additionally, investors receive a higher yield and diversify their portfolio by
owning an asset class historically earmarked for banks.
However, P2P platforms possess less expertise in consumer lending, especially in
assessing credit risk relative to banks. Credit risk in banking is defined as the likelihood that a
borrower or counterparty fails to meet his/her contractual agreements to the lender. Moreover,
asymmetric information issues are ubiquitous in P2P lending. Historically banks have minimized
credit risk by acquiring a large amount of data on borrowers and putting a premium on relational
rather than transactional lending (Calebe, Loriana, & Paolo, 2016). The P2P marketplace
inherently lacks such historical data. Therefore, investors are more prone to credit risk due to
information asymmetry.
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This paper attempts to build predictive models which could be used by an investor to
estimate credit default risk. To achieve this objective, data from a well-known platform Lending
Club (LC) is utilized. The basic rationale for the study is that there is a need of investors to
properly gauge the credit risk of a potential borrower hence a model could assist in the loan
selection process.
Although there are many factors that could trigger default on a loan, this paper
investigates factors provided by the platforms such as: the borrower’s credit score, debt to
income ratio (DTI), revolving debt utilization rate, annual income, length of credit history, public
records, level of education.
This paper is organized in the following manner: Chapter II presents the literature review
on credit risk in P2P marketplace. Chapter III describes the data and its origin. Chapter IV
presents the methodology in evaluating risk including logistic regression, neural networks and
random forest. Chapter V presents the empirical results and finally chapter VI concludes with
our findings and key policy recommendations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Genesis of P2P Lending
P2P Lending also known as marketplace lending stems from the development of the
internet and the rise of e-commerce. The vast opportunities provided by the web and big data
coupled with investors need for a higher yield have contributed to the birth of the industry. The
first platform to see the day in the U.S was Prosper marketplace which was set up in 2006 to act
as marketplace were investors and borrowers could transact as an “e-bay” for loans (Milne &
Parboteeah, 2016). The marketplace lending quickly established itself as an alternative to bank
loans and credit cards. Platforms like Lending Club and Funding Circle emerged to capture
market share in the lucrative consumer finance space (Schumpeter, 2013). Several factors have
contributed to the success of P2P Lending, (1) a lagging regulatory regime, (2) the opportunity
for investors to earn a higher yield in a period of depressingly low interest rates, (3) the
provision of credit in underserved segments, and (4) technological agility relative to the big
banks (Milne & Parboteeah, 2016). However, as the industry matures small investors have been
crowded out of the space by large institutional investors such as banks, hedge funds and asset
managers (Demyanyk, Loutskina, & Kolliner, 2017). Furthermore, many policymakers and
analysts have questioned the benefits of the industry to the average borrower. Many believe that
P2P loans are predatory in nature and provide negligible funds to underserved areas and the
underbanked population (Demyanyk et l., 2017). Moreover, some analysts fear the peer to peer
industry exacerbates the level of financial distress by charging exorbitant rates. Additionally,
sceptics claim an over supplying of credit to the financially distressed and minority segments of
the consumer market with lower levels of education and higher levels of debt (Demyanyk et al.,
2017). An increase in the supply of loans ceteris paribus will lead to a decrease in the prevailing
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market interest rate and increase access overall. However, given the lack of financial education
in the general society marketplace lending may facilitate access to excessive and untenable
amounts of debt. As attested by the Great Recession, borrowers and lenders alike can make
suboptimal decisions leading to financial stress and higher levels of debt (Dore & Mach, 2019).
To make matters worse, a study by Demyanyk et al. (2017) found that the debt level for P2P
borrowers actually increased and credit scores decreased ex post receiving a loan. This is
especially concerning given that marketplace lenders have always touted the product as a
channel to pay down high interest credit card debt through consolidation loans (Balyuk, 2019) .
According to LC, 66% of borrowers stated paying down credit card debt and debt consolidation
in general as the intended use of funds, [see Figures 1 and 2], (Club, 2019) .

Figure 1: Reported use of funds (source: https://lendingclub.com).
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Figure 2: Balances by loan purpose (2018 originations).
Figure 2 shows that in 2018 almost 8 billion US dollars were borrowed on LC. The
largest portion of the funds was borrowed for debt consolidation, followed by credit cards debt,
“Other” includes things such as vacations, weddings and medical. Another half a billion went to
home improvement purpose as stated by obligors. Debt consolidation and credit card accounted
for $6.4 out of the $8 billion or 82% of the funds in 2018. This shows that debt consolidation is
by far the most commonly stated usage of borrowed funds.
2.2 Credit Risk in P2P
The literature related to credit risk in P2P is nascent, however an enduring theme of said
literature is information asymmetry. Information asymmetry as the name suggests is a situation
in which one party to a transaction has significantly more information relative to the second
party which can lead to market distortions. Investors in P2P industry face a large amount of
information asymmetry (Serrano-Cinca, Gutiérrez-Nieto, & López-Palacios, 2015). Borrowers
typically have a very good idea of their ability to repay based on private information such
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earning potentials as well as any outstanding obligations while lenders do not. Using data from
Germany Calebe, Loriana, and Paolo in 2016 found that P2P platforms were catering to a riskier
segment of borrowers and supplying them with microloans. Moreover, they found that the return
on P2P lending after adjusting for the risk was lower relative to banks. Notably Hertzberg,
Liberman, and Paravisini in 2019 found that riskier borrowers in the marketplace tend to selfselect into longer term loans which are costlier in the long run and thus signal the borrower’s
likelihood of default. Zou, Huixin, and Zheng in 2017 found that lenders in the marketplace face
a higher credit risk than traditional banks due to adverse selection. Using data from “PPDAI” a
China based P2P lender, they found that loans with less stellar credit ratings and longer terms
charge off at a much higher rate. They also found that the order of credit rating and borrowers
with high credit lines tend to perform well. In another study the determinants of credit risk were
found to be the existing amount of debt of the borrower, the credit grade assigned by the
platform, loan purpose as well as housing situation (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015). Furthermore,
Cornaggia, Wolfe, and Yoo in 2018 found that P2P lenders can create adverse selection issues in
the consumer credit space by cherry-picking high quality loans and leaving banks with lower
quality loans to originate. Sometimes even creating a race to the bottom by causing banks to start
loosening credit quality standards to sustain market share or stamp out competition. Emekter, Tu,
Jirasakuldech, and Lu in their 2015 study of lending club data using logistic regression found
that the key determinants of P2P credit risk include a borrower’s credit grade, debt to income
ratio (DTI) , their FICO score and the revolving line utilization rate. Neural network models have
also been implemented to gauge credit risk in P2P settings. A study by Byanjankar, Heikkila, and
Mezei in 2017 found that it was indeed possible to assess credit risk in P2P and they found that
financial factors rather than demographic ones were more predictive of loan outcomes. Most
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studies have focused on identifying some determinants of credit risk and possible ways to
improve the P2P market. This study contributes to the current literature in three ways: (1) it
identifies key credit risk predictors in P2P lending market, (2) uses three quantitative methods for
assessing default risk and (3) provides a predictive model that estimates ex ante credit risk at the
loan level using available data provided by lending club.
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Chapter 3: Data and Origins
The data for this analysis comes from the Lending Club (LC). It includes individual level
data for 36 months maturity loans made by LC in 2015 for over 5.8 billion dollars. The data
includes loan level credit attributes such as income, debt to income ratio, the credit score and the
status of the loan at the end of Q2:2019. There are 190,190 observations and 145 variables in the
dataset. The data set was split in training and testing sets with 60% of observations in training
and 40% in the testing dataset .Default in the analysis is defined as any account that goes to
charge-off. The variables such as FICO, the credit grade and interest rate have shown a high
information value. The interest rate factor showed a suspiciously high information value pointing
to endogeneity. Accounts with high interest rate will charge off at a higher rate because they are
inherently riskier but also because the interest rate will compound the cost of repayment and
increase the likelihood of a bad performance.
Table 1: A snapshot of the data set.
Grade
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Total

Balances
Loans Count
Mean Loan
Mean Interest Rate Unit Bad Rate
$ 681,256,925
47,174 $
14,441
7.0%
5.5%
$ 737,585,925
58,312 $
12,649
10.1%
11.8%
$ 626,305,000
52,839 $
11,853
13.3%
19.1%
$ 293,336,775
23,705 $
12,374
16.6%
25.8%
$ 92,915,750
7,055 $
13,170
19.2%
32.0%
$ 10,296,275
954 $
10,793
23.6%
42.6%
$
1,563,375
151 $
10,353
26.6%
39.1%
$ 2,443,260,025
190,190 $
12,846
11.4%
14.9%

Table 1 shows a snapshot of 2015 originations with credit grade shown in descending
order. The credit grade is an assessment of loan quality assigned by the LC platform and is
highly predictive of loan performance. Credit grade A is the lowest rated risk and G is the
highest rate risk loan. Most of the lending is taking place in credit grades A through C. The
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default rate increases sharply has one moves from credit A to G. Finally, the interest rate charged
by LC increases in tandem with the credit grade and the probability of default reflecting risk
reward dynamics.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
This chapter examines the variable selection process and methods for estimating credit
default using three well known classification methods: Logistic Regression, Random Forest and
Neural Networks.
4.1 Variable Selection Process
An important endeavor in any scientific study is identifying factors that influence the
phenomena one is trying to explain, it naturally follows that great attention must be given to
identification and selection of pertinent factors. The process for selecting variables and
subsequently modeling them was based on three pillars: (1) identifying the 10 best predictors
with the highest information value, (2) identifying the top 10 variables that showed importance
in random forest decision trees, (3) then the top 10 variables for methods (1) and (2) are used as
inputs to model the probability of defaulting via logistic regression, random forest and neural
networks.
Information value based variable selection techniques. These are well known in credit
risk analysis and have been extensively practiced in building credit risk models, (Deloitte, 2016).
The information value (IV) and a closely related concept, weight of evidence (WOE) rank
variables based on their ability to separate good vs bad loans. The formula for information value
is the following: 𝐼𝑉 = ∑𝑧𝑖=1(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑊𝑂𝐸𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑

(1)

, where z is the number of bins for the factor and 𝑊𝑂𝐸 = ln ( 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑑 ). The next table
illustrates the interpretation of the values of IV for a potential predictor.
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Table 2: Interpretation of information value (Baesens, Daniel, & Scheule, 2016).
Information Value
Less than 0.02

Interpretation
The variable is not predictive

0.02 to 0.1

the variable is weakly predictive

0.1 to 0.3

the variable is moderately predictive

More than 0.3

the variable is strongly predictive

The next three figures and three tables show exploratory analyses that were performed on
all variables to identify the most predictive factors of credit default. Factors with information
values above 0.02 were further utilized in the model building process (Baesens et al., 2016). For
instance, the credit grade assigned by LC is highly predictive given an information value of 0.38
(Figure 3). The default rate increases monotonically from grade A to grades D, E, F, and G.
Grade A has 5.5% default rate overall and accounts for 24.8% of the data or 47,174 loans. At the
other end of the spectrum, credit grades D, E, F, and G have a default rate of 27.7% and account
for 16.8% of the data or 31,865 loans. Grade is clearly an important predictor in assessing credit
risk for LC loans. The conditional distribution of default changes drastically from one grade to
the next (Figure 4 and Table 4). Another variable that showed some predictive ability was the
FICO score at the time of the credit decision (Figure 4 and Table 4). Borrowers with a FICO
score below 685 had a default rate of 18.9% compared to only 6.6% for those with 730 or more
FICO scores. The information value of 0.14 makes FICO an important factor in the analysis as
well. The debt to income (DTI) was found to be somewhat predictive as well with an IV of 0.06.
There is a clear correlation between the amount of debt the borrower has and his/her future
performance on the loan (Figure 5 and Table 5).

20

Figure 3: Default rate by credit grade.
Table 3: Information value for grade.
Grade
A
B
C
D,E,F,G

Count
47,174
58,312
52,839
31,865

Count %
24.8%
30.7%
27.8%
16.8%

Good Loans
44,573
51,438
42,738
23,032

Bad Loans
2,601
6,874
10,101
8,833

Bad Prob
5.5%
11.8%
19.1%
27.7%

WOE
-1.10
-0.27
0.30
0.78

bin_iv
0.20
0.02
0.03
0.13
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Figure 4: Default rate by FICO bands.
Table 4: Information value for FICO.
FICO
[-Inf,685)
[685,700)
[700,730)
[730, Inf)

Count
87,863
36,224
42,567
23,536

Count %
46.2%
19.0%
22.4%
12.4%

Good Loans Bad Loans Bad Prob
71,229
16,634
18.9%
30,724
5,500
15.2%
37,845
4,722
11.1%
21,983
1,553
6.6%

WOE
0.29
0.02
-0.34
-0.91

bin_iv
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.07
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Figure 5: Default rate by DTI band.
Table 5: Information value for DTI.
DTI
[-Inf,13)
[13,21)
[21,30)
[30, Inf)

Count
55,476
63,924
50,467
20,323

Count %
29.2%
33.6%
26.5%
10.7%

Good Loans
49,047
55,054
41,642
16,038

Bad Loans
6,429
8,870
8,825
4,285

Bad Prob
11.6%
13.9%
17.5%
21.1%

WOE
-0.29
-0.09
0.19
0.42

bin_iv
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
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Based on the information values installment amount, PMI and annual income of the
borrower were the three most predictive factors. The interest rate, the subgrade, grade and DTI
were also among the most predictive factors. The top 10 predictors identified through IV for
further model building are shown below, (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Top 10 predictive variables based on information value.
Random forest based variable selection techniques. These have been increasingly
popular and are known to be efficient in building parsimonious models (Liaw & Wiener, 2002).
This study focuses on variable selection based on the mean decrease in Gini coefficient. The Gini
coefficient is a measure of node purity and ranges from 0, a case of complete purity in a node,
to 1, a complete impurity in the node. The importance of a variable is then measured by
assessing the degree of purity/impurity in the nodes when the variable is permutated or excluded
from trees. Since the trees are being built randomly, variables that are important will keep
performing well by having a higher impact in decreasing the Gini coefficient (Dinsdale &
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Edwards, 2019). Essentially the permutation helps measure the importance of individual factors
across all trees such that the importance of the variable is calculated as follows:

𝑉𝐼(𝑥𝑖 ) =

𝑡
∑𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝑡=1 𝑉𝐼 (𝑥𝑖 )

𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒

(2).

According to Figure 7, the random forest algorithm ranked the interest rate as the most
important factor in predicting default. Variables such as FICO, the credit grade, DTI, revolving
utilization rate were also found to be important. However, variables such as purpose, tax liens
and inquiries were not found to be important. This result is consistent with earlier results found
using information value. The rationale for exploring two distinct variable selection techniques is
to arrive to a more robust collection of potential predictors. Given the technical nuances between
information value based variable selection and random forest variable selection the emergence of
similar variables from those distinct techniques reinforces the robustness of the factors in
question. Information Value measures the predictive capability of a predictor in discerning good
loans from bad loans. Random forest on the other hand builds several trees and permutates the
variable in and out of the forest while assessing how pure, i.e. how homogeneous the nodes of
the trees become in the presence/absence of the factor. Additionally, Random forest tends to
favor continuous factors and variables with high cardinality.
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Figure 7: Variable importance: Random forest.
4.2 Modeling Techniques
We start with logistic regression which is widely used in the industry for default
modeling and provides a solid theoretical framework for estimating default. Secondly, we
explore the performance of Neural Networks and Random Forest algorithm which are widely
popular machine learning algorithms and have proven to be effective in classification problems.
4.2.1 Logistic Regression
The logistic model is an extension of the linear regression model in which we attempt to
predict a binary outcome (0 or 1). This method is well known in the credit risk arena and
classification problems in general (Baesens et al., 2016). The method allows for better
interpretation of model coefficients unlike black box models such as neural networks and
random forest. Logistic regression estimates the conditional probabilities via a nonlinear function
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of factors. The logistic model outputs a probability by estimating the log linear relationship
between the dependent and the explanatory variables:

𝑝=

exp(β0 +β1 x1 +β2 x2 +⋯βk xk )
1+exp(β0 +β1 x1 +β2 x2 +⋯βk xk )

(3)

Where;
p is the probability of the event, Xk is the predictor k, βk is the coefficient of predictor k and k is
the number of predictors in the model.
From equation 1, the logistic regression can be written in its log odds form as follows:

ln (

p

1−p

) = βo + β1 ⋅ x1 + ⋯ + βk ⋅ xk

(4)

The maximum likelihood method is used for the optimization of this logit model. The paper uses
multivariate logistic regression analysis to estimate several models based on the most predictive
variables identifies in part 4.1.
4.2.2 Neural Networks
Neural networks are deep learning algorithms that rose from research in Artificial
Intelligence (AI). They tend to perform well in classification types of problems and have been
successfully implemented in credit risk analysis. Neural networks have gained prominence in
recent years thanks to their ability to model complex phenomena. A neural network model
typically includes several completely connected neurons. At the start of a network there is an
input layer comprised of all predictors followed by one or more layers. At the end of the neural
network we have the output layer which consists of only one node. All the nodes are fully
connected which allows for backpropagation to take place. Backpropagation is the process which
allows the network to learn from its mistakes and to adjust its predictions by sending signals
back and forth between parameters while minimizing a loss function. Neural networks uses a
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sigmoid transformation to capture highly complex and non-linear relationships. The Sigmoid
function is given by α(π)=

1

(5).

1+𝑒−𝜋

Figure 7 shows a typical neural network with three layers. Firstly, there is one node for each
predictor variable followed by a single hidden layer. The hidden node is also connected to a single output
node. Furthermore, two control nodes are present. The first control nod is connected to the hidden layer
and the second is connected to the output layer. The total number of edges is given by
𝑝𝑘 + 𝑘 + 𝑘 + 1

In the case of Figure 7 we have , 8 * 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 11 edges. The neural network algorithm
iteratively searches for the most optimal sets of weights for each node, like coefficients estimates
in linear regression analysis. Once the weights are estimates new predictions can be made by
providing the set of predictors. At the end of the neural network we have the output layer which
consists of only one node. The prediction of neural networks in one episode is the following:
𝑁

𝑦(𝑡) = ∑𝐽=1 𝑓(𝛽𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘 (𝑡)) + 𝜀(𝑡)

(6)

where βk are the parameters resulting from backpropagation,
Xk are the inputs variables, 𝜀(𝑡) is the error,
f is a nonlinear function and y(t) is the output value (Addo Martey, Guegan, & Hassani, 2018).
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Figure 8: A neural network model.
4.2.3 Random Forests
Random forests algorithm is an ensemble model that fits several trees to arrive to a vote
in the case of classification problems hence the term “Forest”. The algorithm was introduced by
Leo Breiman (2001) and performs well in classification types of problems such as predicting
loan default or predicting admission to a university. Random Forest is robust due to several
bootstrapped resampling that is done at the tree level as well as nod level to prevent overfitting
and to decorrelate the different trees in the forest. Additionally, only a random subset of
predictors is considered each time a tree is built, or a split is done. Effectively the algorithm
randomly select a subset of predictors k from all inputs predictors such that
𝑘 = √𝑧
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where z is the total number of predictors in the model. Another advantage of Random Forests is
their ability to rank variable by importance and thus select those variables that provide purity
based on the Gini Index or Entropy. The Gini Index and entropy are both measures of
homogeneity of class in the nodes of a tree. While Gini measures how many times a randomly
selected observation from the data set would be incorrectly classified. Entropy tries to gauge the
disorder in classifying observations relative to the target variable, having observations from
different classes in a node signifies disorder.
𝑛

𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 = ∑𝑘=1 1 − 𝑝(𝑐𝑘 )𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑝(𝑐𝑘 ))
𝑛

𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = ∑𝑘=1 𝑝2 (𝑐𝑘 )

(7) ,

(8)

Where p(ck) is the probability /percentage of class ck in a node.
Random forest algorithm outputs predictions based on averaging the predictions of all the
trees in the forest such that;
1
𝑘

𝑡ℎ
= ∑𝐾
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑘=1 𝑘

(9)

Where the index k runs over the individual trees in the forest (Stasoft, 2019).
4.3 Model Performance Metric
Although there are several metrics for comparing binary classifiers, this analysis focuses
on the area under the curve (henceforth AUC). AUC is one of the best-known model
performance metrics in assessing the predictive ability of binary classifiers. The AUC curve is a
measure of the area under the receiver operating curve (ROC). ROC is a graph displaying the
performance of classification models at all possible probability thresholds. ROC measures the
discriminative power of a classification model. AUC values range from 0 to 1 with higher AUC
values suggesting higher predictive power of the model. In this paper a higher AUC value
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implies the model is correctly identifying good loans as being good and bad loans as being bad.
For instance, an AUC of 0.9 implies that a randomly selected borrower from the defaulters group
has a probability default value higher than that of a randomly selected borrower from the nondefaulter’s group 90% of the time. AUC is leveraged in this paper to benchmark the performance
of logistic regression models versus random forest and neural network models.

𝐴𝑈𝐶 =

1
𝑚𝑛

𝑛
∑𝑚
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 1 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑝𝑗

(10)

Where i covers all the observations with true class 1 and j covers all the observations with true
class 0 ; pi and pj denote the probability value assigned by classifier to observation i and j when
the condition pi > pj is met then the function outputs 1 (University, 2019) .
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results
This chapter provides the results of predicting the likelihood of credit default based on
identified credit risk attributes via three distinct classifiers. Moreover, the magnitude and
direction of predictors based on four logistic regression models are displayed. Finally, the
performance of logistic regression compared to random forest and neural networks based on
AUC is presented. Based on the empirical results of four logistic regression models (Table 6), we
find that credit grade is an important factor as well as FICO. Moreover DTI, the number of
inquiries in past 6 months, number of satisfactory trades, having a mortgage account and the
payment amount are also important predictors. Moreover, loan amount was found to be
statistically significant although the magnitude of the coefficient suggests loan amount to have a
limited impact on default in practice. A higher loan amount implies a higher monthly payment
which can be difficult for borrowers especially those with existing debt. Additionally, revolving
debt utilization rate, which is the percentage of total credit available currently utilized was found
to be statistically significant. One surprising finding is the direction of the coefficient for
revolving utilization rate. Intuitively one would expect borrowers with higher revolving line
utilization to be more prone to defaulting since they already have a current debt load that requires
servicing. The logistic regression results from Model 4 suggests that borrowers with higher
revolving debt utilization are less likely to default once we account for other factors. One
potential explanation of this is that people with higher revolving debt are more experienced with
credit products and will on average default less even after accounting for the higher debt load
they are currently carrying.
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Table 6: Logistic regression results.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

1.46 ***

1.46 ***

1.71 ***

-2.93 ***

(0.27)

(0.27)

(0.27)

(0.04)

0.61 ***

0.60 ***

0.61 ***

0.77 ***

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

1.07 ***

1.05 ***

1.08 ***

1.29 ***

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

1.41 ***

1.40 ***

1.44 ***

1.68 ***

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

1.67 ***

1.65 ***

1.71 ***

1.95 ***

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.04)

2.17 ***

2.13 ***

2.19 ***

2.44 ***

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.09)

gradeG

1.99 ***

1.94 ***

1.99 ***

2.25 ***

(0.22)

(0.22)

(0.22)

(0.22)

income

-0.00 ***

-0.00 **

-0.00

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.01 ***

-0.01 ***

-0.01 ***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.02 ***

0.01 ***

0.02 ***

0.02 ***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.11 ***

0.11 ***

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.00 ***

0.00 ***

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.25 ***

-0.24 ***

-0.24 ***

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.00 ***

0.00 ***

(Intercept)

gradeB

gradeC

gradeD

gradeE

gradeF

FICO

dti

inq6

loan

num_sats

0.01 ***
(0.00)

mgt_flYes

instal

(0.00)
revol_util

(0.00)
-0.08 *
(0.04)

N

114115

114115

114115

114115

AIC

90147.95

89942.31

90103.11

90407.07

BIC

90263.69

90077.34

90218.85

90522.81

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Note: the names of factors have been abbreviated. The factor inq6 is inq_last_6mths , the factor
instal is installment , loan is funded_amnt and mtg_fl_Yes is binary factor for mort_acc.
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The logistic regression output for model 1 in Table 6 can be interpreted in the following
manner:
•

Having credit grade B, versus A increases the probability of default by 0.61 (grade A
is the reference level).

•

The probability of default increases monotonically as one goes from grade A to F
with a slight decrease at grade G.

•

Ceteris paribus, each 10-point increase in FICO score decreases the probability of
default by 0.1.

•

Ceteris paribus, each 10-point increase in DTI increases the probability of default by
0.2.

•

Ceteris paribus, each additional credit inquiry in the past 6 months increases the
probability of default by 0.11.

The magnitude of the coefficient for the number of recent credit inquiries is particularly
large. This indicates that borrowers with large numbers of credit inquiries within 6 months will
have a very high probability of credit default. Intuitively this makes sense, many credit inquiries
by a borrower is likely due to a severe shortage in liquidity leading to what’s known in the
banking industry as “credit shopping”. Credit shopping refers to the process of contacting several
financial institutions in a short period of time to accumulate debt which is unlikely to be repaid.
Models created with random forest and neural networks are highly complex and lack the ease of
interpretability of coefficients as in the case of logistic regression. However, we can infer from
those models using variable importance plots. The random forest and neural network models
found similar results to the logistic regression. Both the neural network and random forest
algorithms found the most predictive factors were the interest rate, FICO score, credit grade,
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PMI, DTI and the number of inquiries in the past six months. The random forest model built 500
trees with two variables used for splitting at each node. The neural network model with four
hidden layers was found to be the most optimal model among several neural network models
with a maximum ROC of 0.68 (Figure 9). Further comparison of the logistic regression model
versus random forest and neural network shows that a neural network is marginally the best
based on ROC (Table 7). One interesting finding is that although neural network models are
much more complex, they do not always provide better performance. The neural network model
performed only slightly better than the logistic model on the testing data set (Figure 9, Table 7).
This finding is of practical importance given that logistic models provide better clarity and
interpretability compared to black box models such as neural networks and random forest.
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Figure 9: Performance on training data (5 folds cross validation).
Table 7: Model performance on testing data.
Model
Logistic model 1
Logistic model 2
Logistic model 3
Neural Network
Random Forest

ROC
0.68
0.6831
0.6812
0.6848
0.6472
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Figure 10: Neural network model with four hidden layers.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications
P2P lending has been increasingly relevant in today’s banking and financial markets.
There are great amount of opportunities to gain from this novel market and many lessons yet to
be learned. This thesis explores the main factors for predicting loan default in P2P setting and
compared the performance of three modeling techniques. The study found the credit grade of the
borrower, FICO score, DTI, the number of inquiries and annual income to be highly predictive of
loan outcomes. Moreover, loan amount, revolving utilization rate and installment amounts were
found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, borrowers with mortgages tend to be more
creditworthy. Another key finding of the paper is that black box models with hyperparameters
such as neural networks do not necessary yield better performance than classical methods such as
logistic regression in predicting credit default. There are three main policy recommendations
from this paper.
First, the government regulations are needed to harmonize the regulatory regime for
banks and P2P lenders. Marketplace lenders are currently benefiting from regulatory arbitrage
since they are not subject to the same level of regulation as deposit-taking institutions. Creating a
uniform regulatory framework will even the level playing field between platforms and traditional
banks.
Second, limit risk taking: as the data shows Fintechs are growing fastest in high risk
segments i.e. highly indebted, low credit and low-income segments. Despite this high growth, all
the money invested is raise by private investors and the platforms do not assume any risk. A
sudden economic downturn could lead to economic collapse since billions of dollars of loans will
no longer be serviced. This could be more damaging than the 2008 great recession because most
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of the investors on P2P platforms do not have enough political clout to access public rescue
packages unlike banks in 2008.
Third, expand access to financial literacy, from the data above we can see that as much as
82% of the loans issued on the platforms are reportedly for consolidation purposes. This shows
that there is a large segment of the country in debt.
High levels of debts are always dangerous for the economy as shown during the great
recession. More needs to be done to raise awareness of financial products and the risk in
accumulating debt. Some natural extensions of the paper in the future include: (a) modeling
credit default using survival analysis, (b) combining loan-application level data from several
platforms to build predictive models that are more robust. Survival analysis is more dynamic
since the time to default is a critical piece of credit risk assessment. Some later stage defaults do
not incur any losses to the bank while default in the early stages of loan repayment can be
extremely costly. However, the current paper only considers instances of default. The
combination of data from several platforms can also be more robust and instrumental in
assessing P2P credit risk.
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Appendix A: Data Dictionary

Factor
Annual_inc

Alias
Income

DTI

LC assigned loan grade.

HomeOwnership

The home ownership status provided by the borrower.

MortAcc

Number of mortgage accounts.

RevolUtil

Amount of credit borrower is using relative to all available revolving
credit.

purpose

A category provided by the borrower for the loan request.

Inq6

Int_rate
FundedAmnt

PMI
Sub_grade
Mgt_fl

The number of inquiries in past 6 months .
Interest Rate on the loan.

Loan

Num_sats
Installment

The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower.
A ratio of total monthly debt payments on the total debt obligations.

Grade

InqLast6Mths

Definition

The total amount committed to that loan at that point in time.
Number of satisfactory accounts.

Instal

The monthly payment owed by the borrower if the loan originates.
Ratio of payment to income.
LC assigned loan subgrade.
A flag indicating the presence/absence of a mortgage account.
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Appendix B: Correlation between Top Variables
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Appendix C: Neural Network Model Variable Importance
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Appendix D: FICO and Revolting Debt Utilization among Borrowers

